★ Starred in your notes: WAF · IPsec transport vs. tunnel mode · north–south vs. east–west · OSI mnemonic ("All People Seem To Need Data Processing") & Transport = ports · port security · DHCP snooping · loop protection.
Breakdown 1 — Zones, placement, and traffic direction
| Concept | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Security zones | Trust levels: internet (untrusted) → screened subnet/DMZ (semi-trusted, public-facing servers) → internal LAN → restricted (databases, management) |
| Screened subnet (DMZ) | Outside can reach in, but the DMZ should not connect directly to the inside; admins reach it through a jump box (class) |
| Device placement | Firewalls at zone boundaries; IDS sensors where they can see traffic; WAF in front of web apps |
| Attack surface | Every exposed service/interface; minimize per zone |
| Connectivity | In-band (management on the same channel as data) vs. out-of-band (plug into the device via a cable / separate management network — class) |
| North–south vs. east–west | North–south = in/out of the data center from the internet; east–west = between systems inside the data center (class) — micro-segmentation protects east–west |
Breakdown 2 — Failure modes and device attributes
| Term | Meaning | Choose when |
|---|---|---|
| Fail-open | Device fails → traffic passes | Availability matters more (e.g., a monitoring tap) |
| Fail-closed | Device fails → traffic blocked | Security matters more (firewall, data diode) |
| Active | Device can act on traffic (block) | IPS, firewall |
| Passive | Device only observes | IDS, tap |
| Inline | Traffic flows through it (can block, adds latency, can be a point of failure) | IPS |
| Tap / monitor (SPAN) | Copy of traffic (cannot block) | IDS, NetFlow |
Breakdown 3 — Network appliances (class Chapter 5–6)
| Appliance | What it does | Class notes |
|---|---|---|
| Jump server / bastion | Hardened box you must go through to reach a secure zone | "DMZ uses jumpbox" |
| Proxy server | Intermediary between client and server; forward = egress/outbound (filters users' web traffic), reverse = internet → your servers (hides/protects them) | |
| IDS vs. IPS | IDS detects/alerts only; IPS is inline and blocks. Host-based (HIDS/HIPS), network (NIDS/NIPS), wireless (WIDS) | Detection methods: signature (known patterns), heuristic/anomaly (deviation from baseline), stateful protocol analysis (SPI) — protocol anomaly detection |
| Load balancer | Spreads traffic across servers; active/active (all serve) vs. active/passive (some on standby) | |
| Sensors | Collect traffic/logs for the SIEM | |
| Port security / 802.1X | Only authenticated devices/known MACs get a switch port; EAP carries the authentication (supplicant → authenticator → authentication server) | |
| Firewall types | WAF (web application firewall — SQLi/XSS at layer 7), UTM (unified threat management — "all in one; combines a lot; could be a point of failure"), NGFW (app-aware + IPS + identity), Layer 4 (ports/IPs, stateful) vs. Layer 7 (application content) | Stateless = one connection at a time, looks one way; stateful = knows both directions and connection state (class rope analogy) |
| Switch features | Port security, MAC filtering, DHCP snooping, DAI, loop protection (STP), flood guard, MACsec | see 2.5 |
Breakdown 4 — Secure communication and access
| Technology | Key facts |
|---|---|
| VPN | Site-to-site (company ↔ company/branch, always on), host-to-site (remote user → company), host-to-host (computer ↔ computer). Full tunnel = everything goes through the VPN; split tunnel = only corporate traffic goes through, internet traffic goes direct (faster, less inspection) |
| IPsec | IKE (key exchange, UDP 500), AH (authentication header — integrity/authentication, no encryption), ESP (encapsulating security payload — encryption + integrity). Transport mode protects the payload only (host-to-host; AH and/or ESP); tunnel mode wraps the whole packet (site-to-site VPN; "ESP only — common") |
| TLS | Protects application traffic (HTTPS, and TLS VPNs on 443 that pass firewalls easily). Encryption happens at the presentation layer of the OSI model (class) |
| SSH | Encrypted by default; replaces Telnet; SCP/SFTP for files |
| Remote access | RDP over TLS/gateway, VPN, jump host — never expose RDP/SSH directly |
| SD-WAN | Software-defined WAN — routes branch traffic over multiple links by policy |
| SASE | Secure Access Service Edge — SD-WAN + cloud security stack (SWG, CASB, ZTNA, FWaaS) delivered from the cloud for remote/branch users |
From class — OSI reminders: "All People Seem To Need Data Processing" (Application, Presentation, Session, Transport, Network, Data link, Physical). Presentation = encryption; Transport = ports; Network = IPsec/routing. Dense reference: ronbert.com/OSI.htm.
Breakdown 5 — Selection of effective controls (how scenarios are asked)
| Scenario | Answer |
|---|---|
| Public web server must be reachable but isolated from the LAN | Screened subnet + reverse proxy/WAF |
| Admins need to reach servers in the secure zone | Jump server |
| Block SQL injection against a web app | WAF |
| Small office wants firewall + AV + content filter in one box | UTM (accept single point of failure) |
| Must never let malicious traffic through even if the device dies | Fail-closed inline IPS |
| Detect only, zero latency impact | Passive IDS on a tap |
| Remote workers, corporate traffic only through VPN, video calls direct | Split tunnel |
| Site-to-site VPN encryption | IPsec ESP tunnel mode |
| Only company laptops may plug into wall ports | 802.1X with EAP-TLS |
| Stop lateral movement between servers | Micro-segmentation / east-west firewalls |
Quick self-check
- AH vs. ESP? (AH = integrity only; ESP = encryption + integrity.)
- Forward vs. reverse proxy? (Forward = for clients going out; reverse = in front of your servers.)
- Fail-open or fail-closed for a firewall? (Fail-closed.)
- Stateful vs. stateless firewall? (Stateful tracks connections both ways.)
Sources: 20260917_173411.jpg, 20260917_173418.jpg, 20260917_173423.jpg, 20260917_173435.jpg, 20260917_173447.jpg, 20260917_173501.jpg, 20260917_173519.jpg