★ Starred in your notes: port security · DHCP snooping · loop protection (STP).
Breakdown 1 — The mitigation toolbox
| Technique | What it does | When the exam wants it |
|---|---|---|
| Segmentation | Split the network into zones (VLANs, subnets, firewalled segments) so a compromise can't spread | Legacy/unpatchable systems, IoT, OT, PCI scope reduction |
| Access control — ACL | Rules that permit/deny by IP/port/protocol/user | "Only the admin subnet may reach the management interface" |
| Access control — permissions | File/share/object permissions (NTFS, share, RBAC) | Least privilege; NTFS: the most restrictive permission wins (class) |
| Application allow list | Only approved executables run (vs. block list/deny list, which only stops known-bad) | Kiosks, servers, ransomware prevention |
| Isolation | Air-gap or sandbox a system/process | Malware analysis, high-value systems, sheep-dip computer (class: an isolated machine with all scanners installed, used to check removable media) |
| Patching | Fix known vulnerabilities on a schedule; test first (change management) | Most vulnerability-remediation questions |
| Encryption | Protect data at rest/in transit/in use | Stolen laptop, sniffed traffic |
| Monitoring | Logs, SIEM, IDS, FIM to detect what preventive controls miss | Detective layer |
| Least privilege | Only the access needed for the job, for as long as needed | Insider threat, privilege escalation |
| Configuration enforcement | Baselines applied and re-applied automatically (GPO, MDM, IaC) | Drift, "settings keep changing back" |
| Decommissioning | Retire systems properly: remove from network, sanitize/destroy media, revoke credentials/certs, update inventory | End-of-life systems |
From class — ACL rules: Implicit deny → default is "no"; anything not explicitly allowed is blocked (the secure default). Implicit allow → everything is allowed by default (insecure). Firewalls block ports; egress = outbound, ingress = inbound.
Breakdown 2 — Hardening techniques (Chapter 11 in class: patching – secure configuration – application control)
| Hardening step | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Encryption (FDE/SED) | Data safe if device lost |
| Installation of endpoint protection | AV/EDR/HIPS on every host |
| Host-based firewall | Per-host ingress/egress control |
| HIPS | Host intrusion prevention — blocks malicious behavior locally |
| Disabling ports/protocols | Every open port is attack surface; turn off Telnet, SMBv1, unused services |
| Default password changes | Kill default credentials on day one |
| Removal of unnecessary software | Less code = fewer vulnerabilities (bloatware, sample apps) |
From class — trusted operating systems & application control: allow lists (whitelisting) vs. block lists (blacklisting); code signing → the vendor signs the binary so you can verify publisher and integrity (not a guarantee of "no malware" — it proves who published it and that it wasn't altered). Password minimum age ("waiting to change password so they don't change it back and forth") stops users cycling straight back to an old password.
Breakdown 3 — Network-side mitigations from class (Chapter 5–6)
| Switch/network feature | Attack it stops |
|---|---|
| Port security — only specific MAC addresses on a port | Rogue devices, MAC flooding |
| MAC filtering | Unknown devices (weak — MACs can be spoofed) |
| DHCP snooping | Rogue DHCP servers, DHCP starvation |
| Dynamic ARP inspection (DAI) | ARP poisoning / on-path |
| Loop protection (STP, BPDU guard) | Switching loops / broadcast storms |
| Flood guard | MAC/SYN flood DoS |
| MACsec (802.1AE) | Layer-2 eavesdropping |
| Micro-segmentation — each device has its own firewall (class) | Lateral movement (core Zero Trust idea) |
| NAC — checklist before the user gets connected (class) | Non-compliant/unknown endpoints |
| DNS sinkhole / DNS filtering | Malware C2 and phishing domains |
Breakdown 4 — Matching mitigation to problem (exam pattern)
| Scenario | Best mitigation |
|---|---|
| Unpatchable SCADA controller | Segmentation / isolation (compensating control) |
| Ransomware ran from a user's Downloads folder | Application allow list |
| Users keep installing random software | Allow list + least privilege (no local admin) |
| Settings drift after admins "fix" things by hand | Configuration enforcement (GPO/baseline) |
| Attacker moved laterally after one workstation fell | Segmentation / micro-segmentation, least privilege |
| Old server being retired | Decommissioning: sanitize, revoke, inventory |
| Default creds on new IoT devices | Change default passwords; NAC |
Exam tip: "Reduce attack surface" almost always = disable unnecessary ports/protocols/services and remove software. "Limit blast radius" = segmentation/least privilege. "Known-good only" = allow list.
Quick self-check
- Allow list vs. block list — which is stronger and why? (Allow list: stops unknown malware too.)
- What's implicit deny? (Default block for anything not explicitly permitted.)
- What does DAI protect against? (ARP poisoning.)
Sources: 20260917_173159.jpg, 20260917_173418.jpg, 20260917_173519.jpg, 20260917_182510.jpg, 20260917_182520.jpg