From class (Day 1): Confidentiality → encryption. Integrity → SHA-256 (was the file modified? hash it — hashes are one-way; SHA-256 is safe; a collision attack is when two inputs produce the same hash). Availability → server clustering, load balancers, RAID. Non-repudiation → digital signature. Obfuscation → "hard to figure out." Confidentiality controls — managerial: least privilege, need to know, separation of duties ("just give control as much as needed"); technical: encryption, access control (smart cards), steganography. Integrity controls: hashing, digital signatures, backups, version control. Availability controls: redundancy, fault tolerance, patch management. Implicit allow = everything allowed by default (bad); implicit deny is the secure default. Zero Trust → "verify everything before use." Windows share permissions: RO / RW / FC / NA, assigned via AGDLP (Accounts → Global → Domain Local → Permissions). A MAC address should be unique.
Breakdown 1 — The CIA triad (and its two extensions)
| Property | Question it answers | Protected by | Attacked by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | Can only authorized people read it? | Encryption, access controls, classification, DLP | Eavesdropping, data breach, shoulder surfing |
| Integrity | Is it unchanged and trustworthy? | Hashing, digital signatures, checksums, version control, change management | Tampering, on-path modification, malware |
| Availability | Can I get to it when I need it? | Redundancy, backups, load balancing, UPS, patching | DoS/DDoS, ransomware, hardware failure |
Two properties the exam adds to the triad:
- Non-repudiation — the sender cannot deny having sent/signed it. Provided by digital signatures (private key signs, public key verifies). Hashing alone does not give non-repudiation; a MAC (shared secret) does not either, because both parties hold the key.
- Authenticity — proof that data/people are genuine; also from digital signatures and certificates.
Exam tip: If the question says "prove who sent it and that they can't deny it" → digital signature / non-repudiation. If it says "prove it wasn't changed" → hash / integrity.
Breakdown 2 — AAA
| A | Meaning | Answers | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authentication | Prove you are who you claim | Who are you? | Password, MFA, certificate, biometric |
| Authorization | What you're allowed to do once authenticated | What can you do? | ACLs, permissions, RBAC, policies |
| Accounting | Record what you did | What did you do? | Logs, audit trails, session records |
- Authenticating people — factors: something you know / have / are / somewhere you are.
- Authenticating systems — devices prove identity with certificates (802.1X, device certs), TPM-backed keys, API keys, mutual TLS.
- Authorization models — DAC, MAC, RBAC, rule-based, ABAC (detail in 4.6). Know that authorization happens after authentication and is enforced by policy.
Protocols that provide AAA: RADIUS (UDP, encrypts only the password, combines authN+authZ), TACACS+ (TCP, encrypts the whole payload, separates all three — Cisco device admin), Kerberos, Diameter.
Breakdown 3 — Gap analysis
Compare where you are (current security posture) with where you should be (a framework, regulation, or target state), then list the gaps and a plan to close them. Steps: define scope/baseline → gather data (interviews, scans, audits) → analyze deltas → prioritize → remediation roadmap. Often the first step when adopting a standard (e.g., NIST CSF, ISO 27001, PCI DSS).
Breakdown 4 — Zero Trust
Motto: "never trust, always verify." No implicit trust based on network location; every request is authenticated, authorized, and continuously evaluated.
Two planes (from NIST SP 800-207):
| Plane | Role | Components |
|---|---|---|
| Control plane | Decides whether access is granted | Policy Engine (makes the decision), Policy Administrator (issues/revokes the session token & tells the enforcement point), adaptive identity (risk-based, context-aware authentication), threat scope reduction (limit blast radius: least privilege, micro-segmentation), policy-driven access control |
| Data plane | Actually carries and enforces the access | Subject/system (the user/device asking), Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) (gateway that allows/denies per the control plane's decision), implicit trust zones (the small area behind the PEP where the connection is trusted for that session) |
Policy Engine + Policy Administrator together are called the Policy Decision Point (PDP).
Exam tip: "Which component enforces the decision?" → PEP (data plane). "Which component makes the decision?" → Policy Engine (control plane). "Which component communicates the decision to the PEP?" → Policy Administrator.
Breakdown 5 — Physical security
| Control | What it does | Type |
|---|---|---|
| Bollards | Posts/barriers that stop vehicles, not people | Preventive |
| Access control vestibule (mantrap) | Two interlocking doors; only one opens at a time — stops tailgating/piggybacking | Preventive |
| Fencing | Perimeter barrier; height/design sets how much it prevents vs. deters | Preventive/Deterrent |
| Video surveillance | Cameras; deters when visible, detects when reviewed; can use motion detection/object recognition | Deterrent/Detective |
| Security guard | Human judgment, can challenge people, check IDs, respond | Deterrent/Detective/Preventive |
| Access badge | Proof of authorization; can be smart card, RFID, proximity; combine with PIN for MFA | Preventive |
| Lighting | Removes hiding spots; deters and aids cameras/guards | Deterrent |
| Sensors | Infrared (body heat), pressure (weight on floor/mat), microwave (motion via reflected radio), ultrasonic (motion via sound) | Detective |
Breakdown 6 — Deception and disruption technology
| Tool | What it is | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Honeypot | A deliberately vulnerable-looking system | Lure attackers, study their techniques, waste their time |
| Honeynet | A whole network of honeypots | Larger, more realistic lure; observe lateral movement |
| Honeyfile | A fake file with an attractive name ("passwords.xlsx") | Access to it = alert; nobody legitimate should touch it |
| Honeytoken | Fake data (credentials, API key, DB record, email address) | If it's ever used, you know exactly where the leak came from |
Deception = detective control + threat intelligence; it also disrupts attackers by feeding them bad data (e.g., fake DNS records, bogus hosts).
Quick self-check
- Which CIA property does a backup protect? (Availability.) A hash? (Integrity.)
- Digital signature gives which two properties beyond integrity? (Authenticity and non-repudiation.)
- Name the data-plane component that enforces Zero Trust decisions. (PEP.)
- What kind of sensor detects body heat? (Infrared.)
Sources: 20260917_173138.jpg, 20260917_173153.jpg, 20260917_173159.jpg, 20260917_173429.jpg, 20260917_173519.jpg